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BOOK REVIEWS
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF POLLUTION. By James Barros and Doug-

las Johnston. New York: Free Press, 1974. Pp. xvii, 476. $12.95.
During the last decade, the awareness has grown that pollution
is a collective problem of the world community, not merely a problem of individual countries. As a consequence, the few agreements
negotiated prior to 1960 have since been joined by a spate of treaties focusing on ecological issues, and international environmental
law has attained both popularity and maturity of development.
Those who specialize in this field will no longer need to contend
with their ever-growing loose-leaf collections of materials. The InternationalLaw of Pollutionconveniently puts into one volume the
complete texts of, or excerpts from, virtually all of the significant
pre-1973 bilateral, regional, and global agreements, international
arbitral decisions and court cases (and some of their antecedents
from national legal systems), and United Nations General Assembly Resolutions on every facet of the global environment. The intent of the authors, Professors James Barros and Douglas Johnston
of the University of Toronto, is to develop a practical research tool
for students of international pollution control problems, and this
they do.
Barros and Johnston preface their materials with a cursory discussion devoted to the definition and identification of pollutants,
the criteria for pollution assessment and control, the difficulties
encountered in determining priorities of uses and in concluding
mandatory quality standards, and the relationship of national and
international law. However, the essential value of the book is simply its compilation of texts frequently used by the practitioner.
Barros and Johnston sensibly divide their materials into sections
on state responsibility; pollution of lakes and rivers, of air, and of
the oceans; general international cooperation; environmental regulation in international areas; and protection against radiation hazards. The authors have gone beyond a strictly defined environmental field to include a chapter on the prohibition or regulation of
ecocidal weapons and weapons of mass destruction, which permits
a comparison between progress in that area and in the more traditional environmental fields. The authors also include suggested
reading lists. Although it would be hard to fault Barros and John-
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ston in general for their selection of materials, they do foresake
consistency by reproducing in the section on national court cases
only decisions from United States tribunals, and by including in
the section on national legislation only foreign laws (thus omitting
reference to the United States Federal Water Pollution Control
Act' or the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972) .2Regretably,
the book does not provide citations for reproduced court decisions
or international agreements, so the reader looking for the entire
text of excerpted materials .will be unable to proceed easily or
directly to the complete original source. Moreover, the book does
not reveal the status of the various agreements, which often leaves
the reader in the dark about which countries are parties and which
are not.
In their introduction Barros and Johnston point out that most
forms of pollution transcend boundaries; they conclude that unilateral national action is, therefore, an inadequate remedy and
that pollution must be treated with a "modem system of international law suitable to the needs of the interdependent world community. 13 But neither their brief commentary nor the body of doctrine, which they reproduce, provides any assurance or even indication that governments together will, in fact, be prepared to conclude meaningful and enforceable environmental rules and regulations or that unilateral action may not be, for the foreseeable future, a more fruitful way to proceed.
This important question of the relative benefits of multilateral
and unilateral action can perhaps best be considered in the context
of ocean pollution, the most highly developed area of international
environmental law. Since 1954, governments have negotiated a
variety of treaties oriented toward preventing or mitigating degradation of the seas and coastal zones by oil and other noxious substances emanating from vessels. Since 1969, at least seven treaties
have been drafted covering liability, dumping, intentional and
accidental discharges, and coastal state rights to react to imminent
threats. The primary failings to note are that these agreements
have neither directed themselves at the major cause of marine
pollution nor adopted standards or enforcement procedures that
will lead to cleaner waters.
1.
2.

3.

33 U.S.C. 1251 (Supp. II, 1972).
33 U.S.C. 1221 (Supp. II, 1972).
J. BAMROS &D. JOHNSTON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF POLLUTION XV (1974).
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Land-based sources are by far the most significant cause of marine pollution-some claim that land-based sources are the origin
of 80 to 90 per cent of the pollution. Yet, no international conference has been convened to resolve this major portion of the pollution problem. Land-based sources were debated at the 1974 Caracas Law of the Sea Conference and its preparatory meetings, but
virtually no government evidenced the inclination to accept precise or enforceable obligations not to pollute from rivers or outfalls,
and most seemed unwilling to assume even a general duty or responsibility.
Further and equally disturbing, the series of agreements on marine sources of marine pollution fall short of producing either effective preventive measures or adequate remedial measures. The
most recent and acclaimed treaty in the area is the 1973 Convention on the Prevention of Pollution from Ships. Negotiated in London under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Marine Consultative Organization (IMCO), a United Nations specialized agency,
the Convention had as its objective the complete elimination of
intentional discharges and the prevention of accidental discharges.
The delegates to the 1973 conference, however, voted down such
an environmentally sound vessel requirement as double bottoms,
and were unwilling even to consider such modern means of avoiding polluting accidents as lateral thrusters and variable pitch propellers. Generally, only those standards already in use or those
proposed by industry were mandated. The conference did adopt,
over industry objection, a requirement that oil tankers over 70,000
tons be constructed with segregated ballasts. (Ballasting water
used for stability in empty tankers would, thus, be taken into tanks
not used for oil carriage, and the water, when discharged, would
not contain oil.) But so as to vitiate the effect of the segregated
ballast provision, the Convention makes it applicable only to vessels ordered after January 1976, which would exempt almost all of
the world tanker fleet for the next two decades. The convention
places primary enforcement responsibility on flag states (the state
whose flag the vessel flies), which are notoriously lax in pollution
control. The enforcement issue is again being considered at the
Law of the Sea Conference, and both developed and aspiring maritime powers are opposed to granting coastal states enforcement
jurisdiction.
Moreover, the international community has drafted deficient
rules in the area of liability. The 1969 International Convention on
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Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage set a liability limit of
fourteen million dollars, a figure so far below the potential damage
from an oil spill that the Convention was summarily rejected by
the United States Senate. The negotiators, trying again in 1971,
concluded the International Convention on the Establishment of
an International Fund for Compensation for Qil Pollution Damage,
and again adopted an industry guideline, a 30 million dollar limit,
which will likely be unacceptable to the Senate. Barros and Johnston predict a broadening of. the principle of state responsibility,
but delegations at the 1974 Law of the Sea Conference treated
suggested provisions on responsibility and liability as if they were
polluted matter, not to be touched.
Not only have international standards been defective, but, in
some cases, they have hindered the development of environmentally sound national standards. A case in point concerns the 1973
Convention on the Prevention of Pollution from Ships and United
States legislation covering the same subject, the Ports and Waterways Safety Act. Under the Ports and Waterways Safety Act, the
Coast Guard was instructed to establish construction and operational standards applicable to vessels operating in United States
ports and territorial waters. In 1973, the Coast Guard announced
their intention to propose a rule that would have required that
tankers above 20,000 tons have double bottoms.4 However, before
the rulemaking process had been completed, negotiation of the
1973 Convention was concluded. After the conference, the Coast
Guard modified its proposed rule, deleting the double bottom requirement on the grounds, inter alia, that deviation from internationally agreed standards would be unwise, even for United States
vessels in the protected United States coastwise trade.
The multilateral-unilateral conflict will also arise in connection
with liability. The most recent United States law on the subject is
the 1973 Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act' which establishes a 100 million dollar liability limit for damage caused by
pipeline oil. If the United States should adhere to the 1969 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage or
the 1971 International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage,
4. 38 Fed. Reg. 2467 (1973).
5. 39 Fed. Reg. 24150 (1974).

6. 43 U.S.C. 1651 (Supp. 1974).
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which when combined have an upper limit of approximately 30
million dollars, any effort to pass domestic legislation with higher
limits, even though permissible under the Convention, will run
afoul of the same argument-that United States unilateral action
should not exceed the internationally agreed limit.
Thus, while the concept of a regime composed of minimum international standards, which can be raised and supplemented by
unilateral action, is appealing on its face, such a system in practice
leads to unsound environmental rules since the minimum international standards (negotiated to satisfy a very low common denominator) become the maximum standards by inducing national inaction.
This is not to suggest that all forms of environmental cooperation are regressive. One, of course, must balance the composite
benefit of domestic laws that would be passed in the absence of
international action with the fruits of admittedly deficient international rules. While the United States and countries such as Canada
(which extended its pollution jurisdiction in its 1970 Arctic Waters
Pollution Prevention Act) may adopt strict standards, many countries will not, and an argument can be made that modest worldwide standards would be preferable to the high standards of an
environmentally oriented few, with weak or no national regulation
elsewhere. On the other hand, since United States trade forms a
substantial portion of world trade, standards applicable to vessels
coming to or passing the United States could well become the
worldwide norm, and the United States coastline itself would be
better protected if United States regulations were not inhibited by
international rules.
Although broadscale international negotiations have resulted in
low-grade agreements, bilateral and regional undertakings have
been more promising. The Treaty Relating to Boundary Waters
and Questions Arising Along the Boundary between Canada and
the United States has generally been a succesful lever in preventing pollution of waters running between the two countries. The
Oslo Convention on Control of Marine Pollution by Dumping from
Ships and Aircraft, concluded between the countries of that region,
is likely to be a more effective tool than the analogous multilateral
1972 International Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter.
Barros and Johnston, in the introduction to the final part of their
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book, attribute some of the blame for the unsatisfactory state of
international law to the lack of an intergovernmental environmental agency to perform the functions of data collection, promotion,
and revocation. They take solace in the remedy they see in the
formation of the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP),
a specialized agency established after the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment. The early hope of the environmental community that UNEP could create a turning point has
not been fulfilled so far. Even under an independent and actionoriented Secretary General such as Maurice Strong of Canada,
UNEP has been given a limited budget, relegated to a monitoring
function, and precluded by industry-oriented agencies such as
IMCO from playing any meaningful role in the prevention of marine pollution. The very existence of a bureaucracy with an environmental bent cannot fail to help the cause; however unless UNEP
and the responsiveness of governments to it are changed, it will
become the weakest member of the United Nations family.
Reading through the pages and pages of agreements and cases
in The InternationalLaw of Pollution,one might assume, from the
sheer magnitude, that the world community is on the way toward
a comprehensive system protecting the purity of life on earth. It is
a modern tragedy that the international law of pollution contains
standards that are too low and obligations that are neither monitored nor enforced.
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